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A feature of many penal codes is that punishments are more severe for repeat
offenders, yet economic models have had a hard time providing a theoretical jus-
tification for this practice. This paper offers an explanation based on the wage
penalty suffered by individuals convicted of crime. While this penalty probably
deters some first-timers from committing crimes, it actually hampers deterrence
of repeat offenders because of their diminished employments opportunities. We
show that in this setting, an escalating penalty scheme is optimal and time consis-
tent.
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1A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for Repeat Offenders
1. Introduction
One of the most pervasive features of actual criminal punishment schemes is the
increasing severity of punishments for repeat offenders.  This is reflected both in federal
sentencing guidelines (Champion, 1989), and in recent “three strikes” legislation enacted
by many states (Shepherd, 2002). Yet economic models of crime have had surprising
difficulty in explaining this practice.  The reason may be due to the traditional focus of
such models on setting criminal punishments so that only “efficient crimes” are
committed.  If, by committing a criminal act, the offender signals that he values the act
more than the cost that it imposes on society, then why should he face a higher sanction if
he chooses to commit the same, efficient act again?  It follows that increasing penalties
can only be justified if uniform penalties somehow result in underdeterrence.1
Several previous studies have examined this and other rationales for increasing
penalties, but, as noted, they have been hard pressed to justify them.  For example,
Polinsky and Rubinfeld (1991) show that increasing penalties may be an optimal way to
sort offenders who differ in their illicit gains from committing crimes, but this result only
holds under certain parameter values.  Flat and decreasing penalty schedules are also
possible.  Polinsky and Shavell (1998) derive a penalty scheme in which repeat offenders
may face harsher punishments compared to first-timers, but this is only true in the
following qualified sense.  First-timers face less severe punishments than repeaters in the
                                                
1 Polinsky and Shavell (2000, p. 67) and Posner (2003, p. 228) make this point.
2second of two periods, but repeaters face the same (maximal) sanction for their crimes in
each period.  Thus, the penalty on a particular offender never escalates.  Chu, Hu, and
Huang (2000) show that increasing punishments for repeat offenders are justified if
defendants are sometimes erroneously convicted, based on the presumption that the
probability of error declines with each subsequent arrest.  Other studies, however, show
that, for various reasons, optimal deterrence may actually involve declining penalties for
repeat offenders (Burnovsky and Safra, 1994; Dana, 2001; and Emons, 2003).   Overall,
one gets the impression that economic models have overlooked an important aspect of the
repeat offender problem.
This paper offers a different explanation for rising penalties based on a factor that
apparently has not been considered in this context—namely, the wage discount associated
with criminal conviction.  While the existence of such a discount has been well-
documented in the literature for a broad range of crimes and offender types,2 the
conventional wisdom has been that the prospect of lost future income should actually
enhance deterrence (Nagin and Waldfogel, 1998).  We show that this logic is correct with
respect to first-time offenders who are contemplating their first criminal act (the so-called
“full deterrence” effect (Shepherd, 2002)), but once an offender has a record, the wage
discount reduces deterrence by making legal employment less attractive compared to
crime.  Thus, to maintain a given level of deterrence for offenders with a record, the
criminal sanction has to be raised.  The model in this paper shows that such an escalating
penalty scheme emerges as the optimal, time-consistent policy in a simple setting where
punishment is costly to impose, and all crimes should be deterred.3
                                                
2 See, for example, Lott (1992a, b), Grogger (1995), and Nagin and Waldfogel (1995, 1998).
3 However, we expect the result to hold for more general formulations.
32. The Model
Consider a population of risk neutral potential offenders who can commit criminal
acts in two periods.  Offenders receive a private return of b dollars from each act
committed and face an expected penalty that depends on the probability of apprehension,
p, and a sanction that potentially depends on their criminal record.  Specifically, first-time
offenders in either period are subject to a sanction s1 (measured in dollars) if caught,
while repeat offenders (those with a past conviction) are subject to a sanction s2.  (Note
that offenders who committed an act in period one but were not caught are treated as
first-timers if caught for a second act in period two.)  We make the following additional
assumptions:
A1: The probability of apprehension, p, is fixed for both periods and independent
of the offender’s criminal record.  This assumption simplifies the analysis without
affecting the basic conclusions.4
A2: We assume that all crimes should definitely be deterred.  This assumption is
also made primarily for simplicity.
A3: We consider only non-monetary sanctions—that is, sanctions that are costly
to impose.  This assumption, along with the next one, ensures that enforcers will set the
sanction as low as possible, given p, to achieve the desired level of deterrence.
A4: We assume that a constant fraction, α, of individuals in each period are
undeterrable, reflecting irrationality, miscalculation, or a lapse in judgment.5  Further, to
                                                
4 Our results would be affected if p could differ depending on the offender’s record, for example, if police
devoted more effort to apprehending repeat offenders.  In that case, increased deterrence of repeat offenders
(if that were desirable) could be achieved by increasing p rather than increasing s2.  It seems unlikely,
however, that the police could know ahead of time which crimes were committed by repeat offenders.  The
fact that p is not a choice variable does not matter given that we are focusing on non-monetary penalties
(see assumption A3) since it will not be optimal to employ the strategy of making the sanction maximal
while setting p as low as possible.  (See Emons (2003, 2004) for models in which p is endogenous.)
4keeps things simple, we assume that the probability that an individual offender will be
undeterrable is the same for all offenders in each period (regardless of their past
behavior) and equal across the two periods.6  (That is, lapses can be temporary.)
Analytically, this assumption guarantees that some punishment costs will be incurred in
each period, thus foreclosing the (unrealistic) enforcement strategy of setting s1 and s2 so
high that all potential offenders are deterred.
A5: We assume that individuals who choose not to commit an offense in a given
period can earn y dollars in legal employment if they have no criminal record, but they
can only earn y−ε dollars if they have a record, where ε is the earnings penalty associated
with criminal conviction.  Of course, this penalty is only relevant in period two and only
then if the individual committed an act in period one and was caught.7  Finally, we
assume that b>y, implying that rational offenders will prefer crime over legal
employment in the absence of criminal punishment.
We derive the optimal structure of penalties by first identifying the constraints on
s1 and s2 such that rational offenders are deterred from committing crimes in both
periods.  We then minimize the cost of punishment subject to those constraints.
2.1. Sanctions that Deter Rational Offenders
To ensure time consistency (subgame perfection),8 we work in reverse sequence,
starting with the period two decisions of rational offenders.  An offender in period two
either has a criminal record or not.  If not, his expected return from committing a crime is
                                                                                                                                                
5 See Cooter (1991), who models crimes and torts as resulting from lapses of this sort.
6 Thus, for example, an individual is not more likely to be undeterrable in period two if he was undeterrable
in period one, and vice versa.
7 Grogger (1995) shows that the wage penalty declines with time.  This factor does not arise in our model
since the penalty can only be incurred in the second and final period.
5b−ps1, while his return from legal employment is y.  The offender is therefore deterred if
y≥b−ps1,9 or if
s1 ≥ p
yb − .  (1)
Alternatively, if an offender has a criminal record, his expected return from committing a
crime in period two is b−ps2, while his return from legal employment is y−ε.  Thus, he
will be deterred if y−ε ≥ b−ps2, or if
s2 ≥ p
yb −+ ε . (2)
Note that the lower bound for s2 is larger than for s1, reflecting the inferior labor market
opportunities of convicted criminals.  This is what necessitates a higher sanction for
repeat offenders in order to deter them from committing further crimes.  Constraints (1)
and (2) are shown graphically in Figure 1.
Now consider the behavior of rational offenders in period one.  Their two options
are to commit a crime, or to work in legal employment.  We assume that in comparing
these options, they know that they will be deterred from committing future crimes if they
are rational in period two (given (1) and (2)), but they also know that they will
irrationally commit crimes in period two with probability α regardless of their period one
behavior.  Foreseeing this, they account for the consequences of this irrationality in
making their period one decisions.10  Thus, a rational offender calculates his expected
lifetime income from committing a crime in period one to be
                                                                                                                                                
8 Emons (2004) emphasizes the importance of time consistency in deriving the optimal punishment scheme
for repeat offenders, but his model is quite different from ours.  Moreover, his results do not explain
escalating punishments.
9 We assume that when indifferent, the offender is deterred.
10 Our results do not change if offenders cannot foresee, and hence cannot plan for, their possible
irrationality.
6b − ps1 + (1−α)(y−pε) + α[b−p2s2−p(1−p)s1] . (3)
In this expression, pε is the expected wage penalty, while the term in square brackets is
the expected return from irrational crime in period two (given the offender’s period one
behavior).  Conversely, an offender’s expected lifetime income from working legally in
period one is
y + (1−α)y + α(b−ps1), (4)
where the final term again reflects the return from irrational crime in period two.
The rational offender will be deterred from committing a crime in period one if
(4) exceeds (3), or, after re-arranging, if
p(1−αp)s1 + αp2s2 + (1−α)pε ≥ b−y. (5)
According to this condition, an increase in either s1 or s2 enhances deterrence in period
one, reflecting the notion of “full deterrence” (Shepherd, 2002).  Likewise, an increase in
the expected period two wage penalty promotes deterrence in period one (Nagin and
Waldfogel, 1998), though we saw above that it hampers deterrence of repeat offenders in
period two.  Finally, if we substitute the lower bounds for s1 and s2 into (5), it reduces to
pε≥0, which clearly holds.  It follows that constraints (1) and (2) are sufficient to deter
crime by rational offenders in period one as well as two.
2.2. Cost Minimizing Sanctions
It remains to derive the socially optimal values of s1 and s2.  As noted above, these
are found by minimizing the total cost of punishment subject to the condition that all
rational offenders are deterred (i.e., subject to constraints (1) and (2)).
7Total punishment costs equal the number of irrational crimes committed in each
period multiplied by the appropriate punishment.11  If we normalize the total population
of offenders to be one, then the number of irrational offenders in period one is α, a
fraction p of which are caught and punished.  Thus, total expected costs in period one are
simply αps1.12  In period two, the total number of crimes is the same, but punishment
costs differ because some offenders are first-timers (those who did not commit crimes in
period one, as well as those who did but were not caught), and some are repeat offenders.
The expected cost of punishing first-timers is thus p[α(1−α)+α2(1−p)]s1, while the
expected cost of punishing repeat offenders is p2α2s2.  Summing all costs across the two
periods and simplifying yields13
TC = pα(2−pα)s1 + p2α2s2. (6)









A set of iso-cost lines is shown in Figure 1.  Since costs are decreasing toward the lower
left in the diagram, the optimal point occurs at the intersection of the two constraints (i.e.,
where both are just binding), implying that
p
ybs −=*1  (8)
p
ybs −+= ε*2 . (9)
                                                
11 Since p is fixed, the cost of apprehension is a fixed cost in each period.  Thus, we can ignore it in
deriving the optimum.
12 We assume that society and the offender weigh the cost of punishment equally.  If they attach different
costs to punishment, as is likely to be true for prison, then we would need to add an additional weighting
factor (Polinsky and Shavell, 2000).  However, since this would have no effect on our conclusions, we
ignore it here.
8It follows that punishments are more severe for repeat offenders, reflecting the period two
wage penalty suffered by those with a criminal record.
3. Conclusion
The observed pattern of penalties in most penal codes implies a rising sanction for
repeat offenders.  While this accords with common sense, economic models of crime
have had unusual difficulty in explaining it (though not from lack of effort).  Most
existing studies either find no rationale for rising penalties, or provide only qualified
explanations.  This paper has derived an unambiguous explanation based on the existence
of the wage penalty suffered by convicted criminals.  Although the threat of a wage
penalty may help to deter some first time offenders from embarking on a life of crime
(thus possibly allowing lower penalties for first-timers), it actually hinders deterrence of
those with a criminal record by making legal employment appear relatively less desirable.
To counter this, sanctions for repeat offenders need to be raised.  Based on this logic, we
showed that the optimal (time consistent) penalty schedule unambiguously entails higher
penalties for repeat offenders.
                                                                                                                                                
13 We ignore discounting.
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Figure 1: Cost minimizing penalties across periods.
